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ABSTRACT
The present research examined the relationship between goal 
setting, coworker(s) feedback and number of coworkers in a simulated 
temporary work setting. Subjects were 84 female college students 
recruited for pay as temporary replacements to work as data coders. 
When a subject reported for work she was put in a room by herself 
and given 10 minutes to become familiar with the coding task. Then 
the subject was taken to the coding room where the data were kept.
In the coding room were either one or three confederates of the 
experimenter whom he introduced as full-time employees. Then the 
subject was Informed of how many lines of data she had coded during 
the practice session and either asked to set her own goal level (self­
set goal condition) or assigned either the average goal of the self­
set group (average-set goal condition) or a specific hard goal (hard- 
set goal condition) by the experimenter. After the experimenter left 
the room, the subject's coworker(s) commented on the appropriateness 
of the goal level by saying it was either too high or too low. The 
results indicated that contrary to the predictions, subjects* produc­
tivity was significantly influenced by coworker(s) feedback and 
number of coworkers in the self-set goal condition, but not in the 
two experimenter-set goal conditions. A possible explanation for 
these results was suggested by Festinger's theory of social compari­
son. Also, the results indicated that, contrary to the prediction
generated from Locke's goal theory, subjects assigned hard goals did 
not code more data than did subjects who either set their own goals 
or were assigned the average of the self-set goals. Furthermore, 
subjects assigned the average of the self-set group did not perform 
at that level, but instead performed at a significantly higher level 
of performance than did the subjects who had set their own goals. It 
was proposed that these results were due to the confusion of the sub­
jects, over what was an appropriate performance level. This confusion 
was a consequence of contradictory feedback from the subjects' co­
worker (s) and the experimenter. Finally, the Implications of the 
present study were discussed in terms of the applicability of Locke's 




The present study is part of the growing research interest in the 
effect of conscious intentions on behavior- To help understand the 
nature of the present research, imagine the following situation: A
secretary calls her employer and tells him she is sick and cannot 
come to work that day. The employer then calls a temporary help 
firm, such as Kelly Girl, for a replacement. The replacement reports 
to work and is given instructions on what to do, how to do it, and 
what is expected of her. The question arises as to what instructions 
to use when informing the replacement about what is expected of her. 
Should an employer simply say, "do your best" and let the replace­
ment set her own performance level or would it be better if he set a 
specific performance level for her. Also in a work setting there 
usually are other workers who are performing the same or a similar 
task. They have a feeling for what an acceptable level of perfor­
mance is. However, their acceptable level may be different from the 
supervisor's. Under what conditions would these workers’ stated 
feeling modify the effect of the performance goals given to the 
replacement by the supervisor? In other words, in the previously 
described situation what if the other secretaries in the office 
suggested to the replacement that she should disregard what the
boss told her? Or, what if they said that he was expecting too much 
or too little work from her?
Answers to questions such as the above are important to the 
present research which simulated a temporary work situation. This 
study is concerned with assessing the effects of goal setting and 
group influence on the quantity of production in a temporary work 
setting. There are several diverse areas of organizational psychology 
research relevant to the present study. In order to understand where 
this study fits in with past research, and the contribution it hopes 
to make, a review of the relevant research in goal setting and group 
influence is presented below.
Review of the Literature 
Goal Setting
Goal Level and Performance
The studies in this section are concerned with the relationship 
between the goal level the subject is trying to achieve and some 
measure of the quantitative level of his performance (amount of 
output, speed of reaction, etc.). According to Locke (1968), if 
goals regulated performance, then hard goals should produce a higher 
level of performance than easy goals, other things (such as ability) 
being equal.
Locke and his colleagues have conducted a number of experiments 
to investigate goal setting (Locke, 1966a; Locke and Bryan, 1967a).
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In all of these studies, a similar procedure was used: Subjects were
recruited for pay to take part in a psychological experiment. In 
some of the experiments, goals were assigned to the subject by the 
experimenter; goal acceptance was checked by post-experimental 
interviews. In other experiments, subjects set their own goals. In 
all the experiments, goals were expressed in terms of some specific 
quantitative score that the subject was trying to achieve on each 
trial or on the task as a whole.
In the first series of studies, Locke (1966a) carried out three 
experiments. In the first experiment, subjects took part in a brain­
storming task. They were instructed to list objects or things that 
could be described by a given adjective (e.g., "heavy"). Each sub­
ject was given 15 trials of one minute duration with a new adjective 
on each trial. Locke divided the subjects into three groups, each 
with a different standard of success to surpass on each trial: the
easy group was assigned 4 things to surpass, the medium group 9 
things, and the hard group 14 things. The subjects in all three 
groups were told this task was a test of their creativity and the 
standards were what the experimenter considered to be a successful 
performance based on past experience. The results of the experiment 
indicated a linear relationship between goal level and performance 
level. That is, as the goal was set higher, the number of things 
the subject listed increased.
In the second experiment, Locke investigated four additional 
considerations. (1) How high a level of intention would the subjects
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set if allowed to do so themselves? (2) What would be the effect of 
changing the standard of success in the middle of the experiment?
(3) Would the same difference between the easy and the hard groups 
emerge if the experiment were continued for five additional trials?
(4) Would the previous findings (the linear relationship) replicate 
using a slightly different task? The task Locke employed in this 
study was giving uses for objects (e.g., "an ash tray"). There were 
20 trials of one minute duration.
The results indicated: (1) subjects set moderate levels of
Intentions if given the choice, (2) raising the standard resulted 
in an increase in output, (3) the hard group continued their high 
output throughout the 20 trials, and (4) the linear relationship 
between goal level and performance was supported.
In the third experiment in this study, Locke replicated and 
expanded on the part of the second experiment involving changing the 
standard of success for each subject during the study. However, this 
time he did it in a more systematic manner. Subjects in this experi­
ment performed the same brainstorming task as in the second experiment, 
but in three series of six trials. In the first series of trials, 
the subjects were told that to be successful they had to surpass a 
standard of four uses for an object. In the second series, subjects 
set their own standard and wrote it down. Finally, in the last series, 
the subjects had to surpass a standard of 14 uses. The results indi­
cated that the linear model was supported again. That is, the higher
5
the goal level was set, the higher the level of performance achieved. 
This included goals set so high (more than 14 uses) that subjects 
reached them only 10 percent of the time.
In another study, Locke and Bryan (1967a) conducted six experi­
ments (two pilots and four main experiments) to investigate the 
relationship of performance goals to level of performance and degree 
of boredom or interest in the task. In the two pilot studies, the 
experimental conditions were created by giving different goal instruc­
tions to different groups of subjects. He used various instructions 
which ranged from do your best, to try to surpass on each trial a 
score that is eight more than your total score on the four practice 
trials, to surpass a score of six less than your total practice scores. 
The results indicated groups given hard goals produced more items 
during the brainstorming task than did groups given low goals or told 
to do their best. Postexperimental interviews with the subjects Indi­
cated their goal descriptions (whether the subject actually pursued 
his or her assigned goal or if not, what was their goal?) were sig­
nificantly related to performance level. Subjects also indicated 
that trying for a specific hard goal was the major source of task 
interest.
In the four main experiments, the experimental conditions con­
sisted of instructions ranging from do your best to high-end goals 
(on the basis of the performance of the do your best group, goals 
were set that were substantially higher for the high-end-goal group).
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The results of these four experiments indicated that a specific hard 
goal led to higher levels of performance and more task interest 
than a goal of do your best.
There have been a small number of studies by other investiga­
tors of goal difficulty and performance and the findings have been 
similar to those reported by Locke and his associates. Mace (1935), 
in a study of psychomotor performance, found that subjects, who were 
instructed to try to improve their scores 25 percent per day, improved 
at a faster rate than those instructed to improve five percent per day. 
Locke (1966b) reanalyzed some data gathered by Fryer in a study of 
code learning in which some subjects set goals before each trial and 
some did not. Locke found that those subjects who set high goals 
in relation to their past performance did better on the task than 
those who set low goals. Eason and White (1961) found that subjects 
asked to stay on target in a pursuit rotor task for zero, 50 and 100 
percent of the trials did as well as they were instructed to do.
Stedry (1960), in a study of problem solving, demonstrated the 
importance of the subject's personal goals. He told different groups 
of subjects to try and complete different numbers of problems in the 
time allowed. He also had subjects Indicate their own personal levels 
of aspiration, either before or after the experimenter assigned the 
goals. Stedry found that hard assigned goals led to a higher number 
of problems completed than easy goals only if the hard goals were 
assigned before the subjects set their personal goals. If the
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subjects set personal goals first, they tended to reject the assigned 
harder goals and they performed rather poorly on the task.
Finally, Zander and Newcombe (1967) carried out a study of 
"real-life" goal setting. Using the United Fund campaigns of 149 
selected communities over a period of four years, they found that 
communities that set performance goals that were higher than their 
previous years' performance goals raised more money than communities 
setting lower goals than their previous years'. Further analysis 
supported the view that these goals were a cause and not an effect 
of the actual performance.
To summarize, the results of the experiments on goal setting 
and performance clearly lead to the conclusion that the harder the 
goal that is set, the higher the level of performance that is achieved. 
Even though subjects with very hard goals reached them far less often 
than subjects with very easy goals, the former consistently performed 
at a higher level than the latter.
Other Goal Setting Studies
Locke and his associates have carried out other studies that 
explored the combined effects of goal setting and a number of other 
variables (e.g., incentives and motivation) on behavior. Since none 
of these studies are directly related to the present research, only 
a brief summary of them is presented here.
Money. Locke et_ al. (1968) conducted a study in which goal- 
setting instructions and amount of incentive offered for output were
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systematically manipulated. Subjects worked on a brainstorming 
task (giving uses for objects) for three blocks of seven trials 
each. They found that subjects who set their goals high on block 
III relative to block II improved their performance on block III 
more than those whose block III goals were not substantially higher 
than their block II goals. However, they found no systematic effect 
for Incentive. Subjects who had the same output goals produced the 
same amount whether they were paid a bonus for reaching the goal or 
not.
In a second study, reported by Locke et al. (1968), subjects 
worked on a toy construction task. The subjects set output goal 
levels at the beginning and at the halfway point of the work period. 
Half the subjects were paid on a piece-rate system and half were paid 
only for their participation. It was found that the mean output of 
the two groups did not differ significantly in either half of the 
work period. This finding was congruent with the fact that the mean 
goal level of the two groups also did not differ significantly in 
either work period.
Locke proposed that in terms of "real-life" situations these two 
studies suggest that monetary incentives effect task performance only 
by means of their effect on goal setting or the intentions of the 
subjects.
Knowledge of Scores. Locke and his associates (Locke and Bryan, 
1966b; 1967b) have carried out several studies investigating the
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effects of knowledge of scores and goal setting. Typically, in 
these studies subjects were given a task to do and either assigned 
performance goals or told to "do their best." Some of the subjects 
were given feedback about their performance (KS) while they were 
working on the task while some subjects were given no feedback about 
their performance (NoKS). Essentially, Locke and his colleagues 
found that knowledge of results had no effect on performance level. 
Subjects told to "do your best" performed at a significantly lower 
level than subjects assigned a specific hard goal regardless of 
whether they had knowledge of their scores or not.
Motivation. Bryan and Locke (1967) conducted a study to inves­
tigate the effect of goal setting on individuals who are low in the 
motivation that they bring to the task. Subjects were 10 male and 
10 female college students. Subjects were divided into two groups 
on the basis of their performance slopes and scores on a pre-experi- 
mental test and attitude questionnaire. The six subjects with the 
lowest performance slopes on the test and the lowest scores on the 
questionnaire were assigned performance goals for the second and 
third experimental sessions. The six subjects with the highest 
performance slopes on the test and the highest scores on the ques­
tionnaire were told to "do their best" for the next two sessions.
The results showed that by the end of the second testing session the 
group given specific goals had "caught" the Do-Best group both in 
terms of performance and in terms of favorable attitudes toward the
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task. These results suggest that specific performance goals can 
serve to raise the motivation of subjects who are low in the motiva­
tion they bring to the task.
Group Influence
There are many studies on group influence or conformity to group 
norms. Some of the studies most relevant to the present research are 
summarized below.
Group Size and Unanimity
Asch (1951; 1952; 1956) conducted a series of studies investi­
gating conformity in the face of group pressure. The procedure used 
in these experiments was the same in each study: A group was assembled 
in a classroom to take part in what appeared to be a simple experiment 
in visual discrimination. The individuals were instructed to match 
the length of a given line - the standard - with one of three other 
lines. One of the three lines was identical to the standard while 
the other two differed by substantial amounts. Thus, the task was 
unambiguous. The experiment consisted of 18 such comparisons. The 
individuals were asked to announce their judgments outloud (publicly) 
in the order in which they were seated. The important feature of this 
research situation is that only one member of the group was the sub­
ject. He was seated so that he always responded last. The other 
people in the group were confederates of the experimenter. These
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confederates were Instructed to respond with the same wrong judgment 
on certain preselected trials. The subject was not aware of this 
arrangement. On the first two trials all of the subjects chose the 
correct matching line. On the third trial and from time to time 
thereafter the majority responded unanamously with judgments clearly 
contradictory to the real subject's perception.
Asch found that half the subjects yielded and agreed with the 
incorrect group judgment on two or more of the 12 incorrect trials. 
One-fourth of the subjects yielded to the group on four or more 
trials. The percentage of errors made by subjects run as controls 
was less than one percent over all the trials. Asch concluded that 
most persons placed in these circumstances felt great pressure to 
disregard their own perceptions and to conform to the rest of the 
group. They did so by choosing answers that seemed obviously wrong.
In one of these studies, Asch (1956) varied the size of the 
group from one confederate to 15 confederates. The results showed 
that when a subject was confronted with only one other individual, 
he rarely yielded; he continued to answer correctly in nearly all 
the trials. When the opposition was increased to two, however, the 
pressure became substantial and subjects yielded 13.6 percent of the 
time to the erroneous answers of the group. When the opposition was 
increased to three, subjects yielding jumped to 31.8 percent. Increa­
sing the opposition further did not substantially increase the amount 
the subjects yielded. Thus, Asch's results showed that conformity 
increased markedly from one to three opponents and then, evidently,
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reached a plateau at this size, only increasing slightly as the 
group size increased to 15.
Rosenberg (1961) using Asch's procedure reported similar find­
ings. However, Goldberg (.1954) and Kidd (1958) found no difference 
in conformity as group size increased. Goldberg (1954), using a 
different procedure from Asch's, investigated the conditions under 
which group members will conform to the social norms of their group. 
In this study, Goldberg had subjects judge the intelligence of nine 
black males by looking at their high school yearbook pictures. The 
pictures were judged repeatedly in a group setting for a total of 
105 judgments in the session. A second session of judgments was 
administered in which each group member individually judged the same 
photographs. In this second session, every time a picture was shown, 
the experimenter informed the experimental subjects of what the 
average group judgment had been in the first session while the con­
trol subjects were not told the average group judgments. The group 
estimates given the experimental subjects were fictitious. They were 
manipulated to be a certain distance from the subject's estimate in 
the first session. The results of Goldberg's study showed that sub­
jects in the experimental group significantly conformed to the 
fictitious group judgments. Goldberg also looked at whether confor­
mity occurred more in a group of two or in a group of four persons. 
His results indicated no significant effect for group size. Subjects 
making judgments in the first session with one other person or three
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other persons showed the same degree of conformity to group norms 
in the second session.
Kidd (1958), also using a procedure different from Asch's, 
investigated the effect of group size, duration of participation, 
and the identiflability of the source of the response standard on 
social influence. He had a single subject or groups of two, four, 
or six subjects work on three tasks: an anagram, a jumbled sentence
and a jigsaw puzzle. The length of an experimental session was one 
hour with some groups meeting for two or three sessions 48 hours 
apart. Following the final session, the subjects were asked to help 
in a brief study. They were seated in a row separated from each other 
by seven feet. They observed a flickering light for five seconds and 
were asked to estimate the number of flickers and write them down.
When the estimates were completed, the experimenter collected the 
response slips and after a short interval he returned to each subject 
a fictitious group average. The subjects were then asked to observe 
the flickering light again and make new estimates. Those subjects 
who took part in the task sessions alone were given a nonidentifiable 
source for the fictitious average. The results of this study failed 
to reveal differences in conformity due to group size (two or four 
persons), or due to duration of participation (one, two, or three 
hours). Kidd's data did, however, support his hypothesis that social 
influence increases if the source of the response standard is 
identifiable.
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The results of the research on the effect of group size on 
conformity are contradictory. Researchers using the Asch procedure 
have found that group size significantly influences conformity 
while researchers using other procedures have not found this effect.
One possible explanation for the differences in results can be found 
by examining the differences in the procedures.
In Asch’s procedure, (1) the confederates were present when the
subject made his response and (2) the response by the subject was
made publicly so that it was heard by the confederates. The presence 
of two confederates could reasonably be expected to produce more 
pressure in this situation than the presence of one confederate. It 
seems easier to ignore the deviant responses of one confederate who 
is present than the deviant responses of two or more other confederates 
who are present. However, in Kidd's procedure the responses of the 
subject were not made public while in Goldberg's procedure the group
members were not even present when the subject made his responses.
The research procedures of Kidd and Goldberg seem likely to have 
generated less pressure to conform than Asch's procedure. This dif­
ference may explain the apparently contradictory findings with respect 
to the group size variable.
One of the distinctive characteristics of the Asch procedure is 
that each subject is opposed by a unanimous majority. Asch (1956) 
also carried out several studies to determine the effect on conformity 
of a nonunanimous majority. In these studies Asch used the same
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procedure that was described earlier except that one of the 
confederates would either answer correctly —  that is, he would 
choose the line that matched that standard —  or he would dissent 
from the majority, but he would also disagree with the subject —  
that is, the majority would choose one of the incorrect lines and 
the dissenting confederate would choose the other incorrect line. 
Asch found that in both of these situations the compliance behavior 
of the subjects attenuated considerably from the level found when 
subjects had faced confederates who made unanimous judgments.
Other researchers (e.g., Allen and Levine, 1969) have reported 
similar findings.
In summary, the results on the effect on compliance behavior 
of the size of the group opposing the subject are contradictory. 
Researchers using the Asch procedure have found that group size 
influences conformity while researchers using other procedures have 
not found this effect. Also research has found that compliance to 
group pressure is highest when subjects are faced with a unanimous 
majority; however, when there is just one dissenter in the group 
compliance to group pressures attenuates considerably.
Group Norms
Many of the observations on the effect of group norms on pro­
duction reported in the literature are usually described as restric­
tion of output (Roethlisberger and Dickson, 1939; Taylor, 1911; 
Whyte, 1955). Restriction of output occurs when workers are
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pressured by their coworkers to hold down production and they do 
so.
Roethlisberger and Dickson (1939) during the final phase of the 
research program at Western Electric described the role that group 
norms played in the Bank Wiring room study. The group involved in 
this study was composed of male workers who assembled switches for 
central office switchboard equipment. The group was isolated in an 
observation room. The bank wiring task involved three groups of 
workmen whose work was highly interrelated: (1) the wiremen, who
wired terminals; (2) the soldermen, who solidified connections; and 
(3) the inspectors, who checked an the quality of the work. Alto­
gether there were nine wiremen, three soldermen and two inspectors. 
Wage payments were based on the group incentive plan which rewarded 
each worker on the basis of the total output of the group.
One of the first things the researchers noticed was that the 
workers had a clear-cut feeling of what was a fair day's work and 
this was lower than management's standard of output. Group senti­
ment prevailed on each worker not to exceed or fall below the informal 
group output norm. Three facts summarize the researchers' discoveries: 
(1) restriction of output was deliberate and set by the work group 
regardless of management's idea of output, (2) workers smoothed out 
the production reports to avoid the appearance of working too fast 
or too slowly, and (3) the group developed its own devices to bring 
nonconforming members into line. Numerous other authors have
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described similar instances of organized restriction of output by 
work groups on incentive payment plans (e.g., Collins, Dalton, 
and Roy, 1946; Taylor, 1911; Whyte, 1955).
In a study not involving workers on an incentive plan, French 
and Zander (1949) reported evidence of low performance norms among 
girls in a large office. Using sociometric questionnaires, French 
and Zander found an inverse relationship between popularity and 
productivity. That is, the harder a woman worked the less popular 
she was. This resulted in many of the women restricting their output. 
Other researchers have reported similar findings (Mathewson, 1931; 
Seashore, 1954).
Though low performance norms have received the most attention in 
the literature, it would be incorrect to assume that all work group 
pressure has the effect of lowering productivity. These informal 
norms may work in the opposite direction. Vroom (1969) states that 
"even a casual observation of groups of research scientists, profes­
sors or managers would be likely to lead to the conclusion that 
informal pressures which are prevalent in such situations are likely 
to induce a higher level of performance rather than restriction of 
output (p. 224)."
The experiments reported by Roethlisberger and Dickson (1939) 
in the Relay Assembly room illustrate a case where group norms 
encourage high output. In these experiments, six women who assembled 
small relays were placed in a separate room with an observer away 
from the other relay assemblers. During the course of the experiments
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various manipulations were performed: rest periods of various
lengths were introduced, the work week was shortened, etc., and all 
of these things were removed. The results Indicated that no matter 
what the investigators did, production rose. While the experimental 
design did not permit an unequivocal interpretation of this finding, 
Roethlisberger and Dickson attributed it, in part, to the develop­
ment of a new set of norms regarding behavior on the job.
In summary, the norms held by a group may result in pressure for 
employees to be either high or low producers.
Sex
Crutchfield (1955) conducted a series of studies to investigate 
the incidence of conformity in various populations. One of his 
studies in this series examined group composition in terms of sex 
of the group members. The procedure was similar to Asch’s (1956).
A subject viewed a series of slides projected on a wall with each 
slide requiring a judgment by the subject. The subjects were run 
in groups, but each subject was in his own booth with an instrument 
panel. By throwing the appropriate switch on the panel the subject 
could register his or her judgment. There was also a row of lights 
that supposedly indicated the judgments of the other subjects in the 
group. In actuality the experimenter determined how the instrument 
panel would light up. The subjects took turns going first, second 
and so on. When a subject was in the last position, he found that 
the lights on his panel indicated that the other four people had
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unanimously made the wrong judgment. The subjects consisted of 40 
females and 19 males. Female subjects were grouped with other 
female subjects and male subjects with other males. The results 
indicated that female college students exhibited significantly 
higher amounts of conformity than male college students.
Tuddenham (1958) found the same results using the same experi­
mental situation as Crutchfield. Tuddenham was investigating the 
effects of an erroneous majority upon an individual’s judgment when 
a continuous range of responses was available for the subject instead 
of multiple choice items with discrete unordered alternatives. Sub­
jects in this study responded on a nine point scale ranging from one, 
"very strongly disagree," to nine, "very strongly agree." Both male 
and female subjects were used. Tuddenham's results supported the 
findings of Asch (1956) and Crutchfield (1955) that some people will 
report personal judgments that are fantastically inaccurate provided 
they are informed that others are making the same judgment. Tudden­
ham's results also supported Crutchfield's findings that female 
college students tend to be more susceptable to group influence than 
are male college students.
Finally, Allen (1965) in a review of the literature on situa­
tional factors in conformity concludes that "differences in amount 
of conformity for males and females has been repeatedly demonstrated 
with females generally conforming more than males . . . .  The 
finding holds, it should be noted, for groups composed of like-sex
20




The present study brought together for the first time the two 
significant research traditions of goal setting and group influence 
in order to help understand some components of the temporary work 
situation. It investigated the effects of three variables: (1) goal
assignment (self-set, average-set, or hard-set), (2) coworker feedback 
on the goal level set (too low or too high), and (3) number of co­
workers (one or three) on the quantity of production in a temporary 
work setting.
In order to stimulate a work situation, it was desirable that the 
subjects believed that they were being recruited for a real job. The 
experimenter initially recruited female students by telling them that 
he needed people to work as data coders for an on-going research pro­
ject. Females were selected because most temporary workers are women. 
The female students were told that the job required that they work one 
hour a day every day for three to four weeks and that they would be 
paid $5 an hour which was the university's rate for coders. One or two 
weeks after students volunteered to work, they were called and told 
that they had not been hired full time, but that one of the full-time 
coders was sick and would the subject replace her just for the day?
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Thus, It was made clear to the subject that she was only a temporary 
replacement.
When a subject reported for work, she was met by the experimenter 
and he explained the job to her. The subject was given 10 minutes to 
get accustomed to the coding task. Then the experimenter took the 
subject to the coding room where the data were kept and she would work. 
In the coding room were either one or three confederates of the experi­
menter whom he introduced to the subject as full-time coders. The 
experimenter then looked over the work the subject had done alone and 
announced that she had coded so many lines per minute. At this point, 
the experimenter asked the subject to set her own rate for the remainder 
of the hour (self-set goal condition) and to tell him what it was or 
he assigned the subject either a hard goal (i.e., 50 percent higher 
than the average number of lines per minute coded in the self-set goal 
condition) or a goal that was the average of the self-set goals.^ This 
is similar to the procedure employed by Locke (1966a). As soon as the 
experimenter left the room the confederate(s) remarked to the subject 
that the rate set was either too high or too low. Five minutes later, 
the confederate(s) again commented on the production rate. Then they 
returned to work again for the remainder of the hour.
Locke and his associates (Bryan and Locke, 1967; Locke, 1966a; 
Locke and Bryan, 1967a; Locke, Bryan and Kendall, 1968) have performed
^The criterion used to define the hard-set goal was similar to the 
procedure that Locke (1966a) used to determine goal levels in his 
research.
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many experiments that Indicate that goal setting improves performance. 
However, all of these studies have been done in laboratory settings 
with the subjects recruited for a psychological experiment. The way 
individuals behave in a laboratory situation and in a work situation 
may not be the same. According to Campbell, Dunnette, Lawler, and 
Weick (1970), results obtained from individuals working in a labora­
tory on a task may not be quite so easy to obtain in a "real-life" 
work setting. In the present research, on the other hand, the sub­
jects were recruited for money to perform a job. They were not aware 
they were participants in psychological research. This is believed 
to be a distinct advantage over Locke's procedure.
In a work setting, the individual usually has coworkers and is 
not in isolation. The literature (e.g., Roethlisberger and Dickson, 
1939; Whyte, 1955) indicates that a person's coworkers have a great 
effect on the work situation. However, Locke and his associates 
set performance goals for subjects who were working either in isola­
tion or in a group setting where there was no contact or communication 
between subjects. In the present research, a subject worked with 
coworkers who interacted with the subject. This is believed to be 
another advantage of the present procedure and it also enabled the 




The present research tested several hypotheses that primarily 
were derived from past research.
1. Based on the results of work by Locke and his associates 
(Locke, 1966a; Locke and Bryan, 1967a), it was hypothesized that sub­
jects assigned a specific hard goal by the experimenter would perform 
at a higher level, (i.e., code more data) than both subjects who set 
their own goals and subjects whom the experimenter assigned the 
average of the self-set goals. Furthermore, subjects who were 
assigned the average of the self-set goals would perform at the same 
level as subjects who set their own goals. This will be supported by 
a significant main effect for goal assignment in the analysis of 
covariance.
2. Based on the studies of Roethlisberger and Dickson (1939) and 
Whyte (1955), it was hypothesized the productivity would be higher when 
the coworker(s) said that the goal set was too low than when the co­
worker (s) said that the goal set was too high. This will be supported 
by a significant main effect for coworker feedback in the analysis of 
covariance.
3. As stated previously, the results with respect to the number 
of confederates are contradictory. However, in the present research, 
as in Asch's studies, the responses of the subject both were in the 
presence of the coworker(s) and were public. Therefore, Asch's find­
ings (1956) and not those of Goldberg (1954) or Kidd (1958) seem most
relevant to the present research. As a result, it was hypothesized 
that the feedback of three coworkers would have more of an effect 
on performance than the feedback of one coworker. When one coworker 
feedsback that the goal level set is too low, this will produce less 
of an output increase than if three coworkers state the goal level 
is too low. Moreover, when one coworker feedsback that the goal level 
is set too high, this should produce less of a production decrease 
than if three coworkers state this. This will be supported by a 
significant number of coworkers x coworker feedback interaction in 
the analysis of covariance and not by a significant main effect for 
number of coworkers.
4. As indicated, Stedry (1960) found that when subjects set 
their own goals first, they tended to reject the goals set by the 
experimenter. From this, it was hypothesized that when subjects set 
their own goals, their output will stay the same whether the co- 
worker(s) say the goal is too high or too low. However, when the 
experimenter assigns the goal level the subjects should be vulnerable 
to coworker pressure, and thus, they will increase their output when 
the coworker(s) say the goal level set by the experimenter is too low 
and decrease their output when the coworker(s) say the goal is too 
high, This will be supported by a significant goal assignment x 





In order to simulate a work situation it was necessary that 
subjects believed they were volunteering for an actual job. Stu­
dents at Louisiana State University in Baton Rouge, were recruited 
by the experimenter with the following story:
My name is Bob Lichtman and I am a member of a 
research team here at LSU. We need to hire people to 
code data that we have been collecting for our project.
The job requires one hour of work every day for three 
to four weeks. The pay is $5 an hour which is the 
university's rate for part-time data coders. I can 
only hire women right now. This is because the project 
is funded by a grant which stipulates that an equal 
number of men and women be hired. At this moment, we 
have hired about 70 more men than women. Thus, until 
this imbalance is corrected I can only hire women.
If you are interested in this job, please sign 
the sheet that will be passed around. We need a lot 
of coders due to the large amount of data and the short 
work periods. Also, I want to mention that if more 
people sign-up than can be used, some people may very 
well not be hired. Again, the pay is $5 an hour and 
we will only hire you for one hour a day for about 
four weeks. If you are interested please fill-in the 
necessary information on the sign-up sheet. Those of 
you who sign-up should hear from me in about 10 to 15 
days. Thank you.
If anyone asked why the job was only an hour a day, they were told the 
following: "We have found from past experience that this is what
works out the best."
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Two-to-three weeks later subjects were contacted by phone by the 
experimenter and told the following:
X am calling you about the data coding job that you 
signed-up for. I am sorry to say that I over-recruited 
and you have not been hired on a regular basis. However, 
one of the coders is sick and I was wondering if you would 
fill in for her just for a day? You will be paid $5 for 
the hour you work.
If the subjects agreed to temporarily replace the regular coder she 
was told when and where to report for work.
Characteristics of the Subjects
Eighty-four female students at Louisiana State University in 
Baton Rouge served as subjects. The subjects ranged in age from 16.9 
to 43.2 years old with the median age being 20.0 years old.
Experimental Design
The effects of the independent variables on worker performance 
were investigated using a 3 (goal assignment - self-set, average-set, 
or hard-set) x 2 (coworker feedback on the goal level set - too high 
or too low) x 2 (number of coworkers - one or three) factorial design.
Procedure
Subjects were run individually with one or three confederates 
acting as regular coders, depending on the experimental condition.
When the subject first arrived for work, she was put in a room by 
herself and the experimenter explained how to perform the coding task. 
Then the subject was given 10 minutes to become familiar with the task.
After 10 minutes, she was moved to another room where the data 
to be coded were kept and where the confederate(s) was already work­
ing. A clock with a second hand was on a cabinet in the front of 
the room. Four small tables with chairs were arranged at right 
angles to each other to form one large table with the data and coding 
sheets placed in the middle. In the condition where the subject 
worked with three confederates, the subject was placed at the head 
of the table. If the subject looked to either side or straight ahead 
she could see the confederates working. In the condition where the 
subject worked with one confederate, the subject and the confederate 
were seated at opposite ends of the table. If the subject looked 
straight ahead she could see the confederate working. In both con­
ditions the subject was seated so that she could easily observe what 
her coworker or coworkers were doing.
When the experimenter and the subject entered the coding room, 
the experimenter introduced the subject to the confederate(s). Then 
he examined the work the subject had done while alone and informed 
her that she had coded so many lines per minute. Then he either set 
a goal that was the average of the self-set goals (88 lines) or a 
goal that was about 50 percent higher than the average of the self­
set goals (135 lines) or he asked the subject to set her own goal 
for the remaining time and to tell him what it was. The experi­
menter then left the room.
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Immediately after the experimenter left the room one or all of 
the confederates made one of the following comments, depending on 
the experimental condition:
Self-set goal - one confederate
High condition -
"I have been doing this coding for two weeks now 
and the rate you set for yourself is really too high.
I have been averaging much less than that an hour."
Five minutes later the confederate said, "Now that you 
have been doing this for a while you can see that the 
rate you set is too high."
If the subject questioned either of these statements, 
the confederate was instructed to respond with: "Well,
I have been doing this for two weeks and I have been 
averaging much less."
Low condition -
"I have been doing this coding for two weeks now 
and the rate you set for yourself is really too low.
I have been averaging much more than that an hour."
Five minutes later the confederate said, "Now that 
you have been doing this for a while you can see that 
the rate you set is too low."
If the subject questioned either of these statements, 
the confederate was instructed to respond with: "Well,
I have been doing this for two weeks and I have been 
averaging much more."
Experimenter assigned goals - one confederate
High condition -
"I have been doing this coding for two weeks now 
and the rate Bob set for you is really too high. I 
have been averaging much less than that an hour." Five 
minutes later the confederate said, "Now that you have 
been doing this for a while you can see that the rate 
Bob set is too high."
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If the subject questioned either of these statements, the 
confederate was instructed to respond with: "Well, I
have been doing this for two weeks and I have been averaging 
much less."
Low condition -
"I have been doing this coding for two weeks now and 
the rate Bob set for you is really too low. I have been 
averaging much more than that an hour." Five minutes 
later the confederate said, "Now that you have been 
doing this for a while you can see that the rate Bob 
set is too low."
If the subject questioned either of these statements, 
the confederate was instructed to respond with: "Well,
I have been doing this for two weeks and I have been 
averaging much more."
Self-set goal - three confederates
High condition -
1st confederate: "I have been doing this coding for two
weeks now and the rate you set for yourself is really too 
high. I have been averaging much less than that an hour."
2nd confederate: "That's right. The same is true for me."
3rd confederate: "They’re right. We have been averaging
much less than that an hour."
Five minutes later:
2nd confederate: "Now that you have been doing this for
a while you can see that the rate you set is too high."
If the subject questioned either of these statements, the 
confederates were instructed to respond with:
1st confederate: "Well, we have been doing this for two
weeks and we have been averaging much less."
3rd confederate: "That's right."
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Low condition -
1st confederate: "X have been doing this coding for two weeks 
now and the rate you set for yourself is really too low. I 
have been averaging much more than that an hour."
2nd confederate: "That's right. The same is true for me."
3rd confederate: "They're right. We have been averaging
much more than that an hour."
Five minutes later:
2nd confederate: "Now that you have been doing this for a
while you can see that the rate you set is too low."
If the subject questioned either of these statements, the 
confederates were instructed to respond with:
1st confederate: "Well, we have been doing this for two weeks
and we have been averaging much more."
3rd confederate: "That's right."
Experimenter assigned goals - three confederates
High condition -
1st confederate: "I have been doing this coding for two
weeks now and the rate Bob set for you is really too high.
I have been averaging much less than that an hour."
2nd confederate: "That's right. The same is true for me."
3rd confederate: "They're right. We have been averaging 
much less than that an hour."
Five minutes later:
2nd confederate: "Now that you have been doing this for a
while you can see that the rate Bob set is too high."
If the subject questioned either of these statements, the 
confederates were instructed to respond with:
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1st confederate: "Well, we have been doing this for two
weeks and we have been averaging much less."
3rd confederate: "That’s right."
Low condition -
1st confederate: "I have been doing this coding for two
weeks now and the rate Bob set for you is really too low.
I have been averaging much more than that an hour."
2nd confederate: "That's right. The same is true for me."
3rd confederate: "They're right. We have been averaging
much more than that an hour.
Five minutes later:
2nd confederate: "Now that you have been doing this for a
while you can see that the rate Bob set is too low."
If the subject questioned either of these statements, the 
confederates were instructed to respond with:
1st confederate: "Well, we have been doing this for two
weeks and we have been averaging much more."
3rd confederate: "That's right."
When the hour was up, the experimenter collected the work, thanked 
the subject and paid her. Locke's postexperimental questionnaire 
and debriefing were not used. It was felt that if they were used, 
the subjects might spread the word that this was a psychology experi­
ment, even if they were asked not to do so. One of the advantages 
of the present procedure over Locke's, is that subjects were under 
the impression that they were being hired for a real job. If the 
subjects had been forewarned that this was a psychology experiment, 
the results could have been less externally valid.
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The quantity of work (number of lines coded per minute) and 
the quality of work (number of errors in coding) was determined for 
each subject. Quality of work has not previously been discussed 
because it has been ignored in previous research. However, it 
seemed relevant to analyze the data produced on this variable. The 
number of numbers incorrectly transposed by the subjects from the 




The number of lines each subject coded during the 50 minute
experimental session was used as the measure of quantity of produc-
2tion (i.e., productivity). In order to eliminate the effect of 
individual differences in the ability of subjects to perform the 
coding task, the number of lines each subject coded during the 10- 
minute practice session was used as a covariate to adjust the number 
of lines each subject coded during the experimental session. A 
3 x 2 x 2  analysis of covariance, summarized in Table 1, was used 
to analyze the effects on productivity of the three independent 
variables —  (1) goal assignment (self-set, experimenter average-set 
or experimenter hard-set), (2) number of coworkers (one or three), 
and (3) coworker's feedback on the goal level set (too high or too 
low). The adjusted means and variances, classified by experimental 
condition are presented in Table 2. A preliminary test for
2The number of numbers incorrectly transposed by the subjects 
from the data sheets to the coding sheets during the 50 minute experi­
mental session was used as the measure of quality of work (i.e., 
coding errors). Since none of the subjects made any coding errors, 
no analysis of the effects of the three independent variables on 




Summary of the Analysis of Covariance for the Number of 
Lines Coded in 50 Minutes Adjusted by the Number of 
Lines Coded During the 10-Minute Practice Session
Source of Variation df MS F £.
Goal Assignment (A) 2 2199.01 4.03 .02
Number of Coworkers (B) 1 267.35 .98 .33
Feedback (C) 1 812.30 2.98 .09
A x B 2 271.07 .50 .62
A x C 2 671.04 1.13 .33
B x C 1 63.04 .23 .63




Adjusted Means and Standard Deviations of the Number of Lines 
Coded Classified by Goal Assignment, Number of 
Coworkers and Coworker's Feedback
Number of Coworkers




















Too High 112.68 101.28
(9.41) (25.37)
Too Low 116.40 111.09
(9.21) (9.26)
^he numbers in parentheses are the adjusted standard 
deviations.
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homogeneity of regression slopes was performed and indicated that 
analysis of covariance was an appropriate procedure, ]? (11, 60) 13 
1.02, £  = .44.
Tests of the Hypotheses
Of the four hypotheses, only Hypothesis 2 —  that productivity 
would be higher when the coworker(s) said that the goal set was too 
low than when the coworker(s) said that the goal set was too high —  
was supported. An individual comparison (Winer, 1971, pp. 384-385) 
performed on the appropriate means revealed that the difference in 
productivity as a function of coworker's feedback was significant,
_t (71) = 1.73 £  < .05, and in the predicted direction:^ subjects 
who were told by their coworker(s) that the goal set was too low coded 
more lines (Adjusted M = 113.34) than did subjects who were told that 
the goal was too high (Adjusted M « 107.11).
The three remaining hypotheses were not supported by the data. 
Hypothesis 1 predicted that subjects assigned a specific hard goal by 
the experimenter would perform at a higher level, code more data, 
than both subjects who set their own goals and subjects who were 
assigned the average of the self-set goals by the experimenter. 
Furthermore, subjects who were assigned the average of the self-set 
goals would perform at the same level as subjects who set their own
^As Winer (1971, pp. 384-385) notes, individual comparisons 
within the framework of an overall analysis of variance (or covariance) 
are appropriate when hypotheses predict the direction of mean 
differences.
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goals. Support for the hypothesis would have been provided by a 
significant main effect for goal assignment in the analysis of 
covariance if the relevant means were in the predicted direction.
In fact, the results did reveal a significant main effect for goal 
assignment (see Table 1). However, inspection of the relevant 
adjusted means, presented in Table 3, revealed that their pattern 
was not as predicted. This pattern is described below under non­
predicted findings.
Hypothesis 3 predicted that the feedback of three coworkers 
would have more of an effect than the feedback of one coworker. That 
is, when three coworkers said that the goal set was too low, produc­
tivity would be higher than when just one coworker said the goal set 
was too low; and when three coworkers said the goal set was too high, 
productivity would be lower than when just one coworker said the 
goal set was too high. Thus, Hypothesis 3 generated the expectation 
of a significant number of coworker(s) x coworker's feedback inter­
action. The results (Table 1), however, revealed that this effect 
was not significant. That is, subjects did not code significantly 
fewer lines in the high feedback condition when three coworkers were 
present than when one coworker was present as had been predicted, and 
also did not code more lines in the low feedback condition when three 
coworkers were present than when one coworker was present as had been 
predicted (see Table 4).
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Table 3
Adjusted Mean Number of Lines Coded 
Classified by Goal Assignment




Adjusted Mean Number of Lines Coded Classified By 








Finally, Hypothesis 4 predicted that when subjects set their own 
goals, their output would stay the same whether the coworker(s) said 
the goal set was too high or too low. However, when the experimenter 
assigned the goal level the subjects would be vulnerable to coworker 
pressure: they would Increase their output when the coworker(s) said
the goal level set by the experimenter is too low and decrease their 
output when the coworker(s) said the goal is too high. A significant 
goal assignment x number of coworkers x coworker's feedback interaction 
would have indicated support for this hypothesis, if the means that 
underlied this effect had been arrayed as expected. The results 
(Table 2) did reveal a marginally significant three-way interaction. 
However, the relevant adjusted means, presented in Table 2, did not 
differ as predicted by the hypothesis. This is described further 
under nonpredicted findings below.
Nonpredicted Findings
The analysis of the data revealed that there were two significant 
or marginally significant findings in addition to the one (the main 
effect for coworker's feedback) that supported Hypothesis 2. First, 
the significant main effect for goal assignment, Hypothesis 1, (see 
Tables 1 and 3) was examined further via Newman-Keuls tests. These 
tests and examination of Table 3 revealed that the adjusted mean per­
formance of subjects assigned the average of the self-set goals 
(Adjusted M = 116.56) was significantly (p̂  < .05) higher than the 
means for subjects who set their own goals (Adjusted M = 103.74);
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however, neither of these means differed significantly from that 
generated by subjects who had been assigned a specific hard goal 
by the experimenter (Adjusted M = 110.37).
Second, in order to analyze the marginally significant three-way 
interaction, Hypothesis 4, further, analyses of the simple effects 
(Winer, 1971, pp. 347-351) were performed. The simple interaction 
of goal assignment and coworker's feedback were examined within each 
level of number of coworkers, since goal and feedback seemed 
to be more interesting theoretically. These tests revealed a sig­
nificant goal assignment x coworker's feedback interaction when three 
coworkers were present, F̂  (2, 71) = 3.44, £  < .05, but not when one 
coworker was present. Further analysis of this simple interaction 
revealed that the coworker's feedback from three coworkers only had 
a significant effect on productivity in the self-set goal condition,
F (1, 71) = 6.94, £  < .02. Inspection of the relevant adjusted means 
(Table 2) indicated that when subjects set their own goals and were 
given feedback by three coworkers, they performed at a higher level 
(Adjusted M = 114.09), coded more data, when told that the goal set 
was too low than when told it was too high (Adjusted M = 90,70).
CHAPTER IV
DISCUSSION
Of the four hypotheses, only Hypothesis 2 was supported by the 
present research. In general, when subjects in the present research 
were told by their coworkers that the goal set was too low, they coded 
more dat than did subjects who were told that the goal set was too 
high. This finding, however, was qualified by the marginally signifi­
cant three-way interaction. The results of the analyses of simple 
effects revealed that only in the self-set goal condition with three 
coworkers present was the productivity of the subjects significantly 
affected by coworker feedback. In addition, though, the adjusted 
means were arrayed in the predicted direction in four of the five 
remaining conditions. Thus, the results suggest that the subjects 
were influenced by the norms of their work group. This finding is 
consistent with past research and observations (e.g., Roethlisberger 
and Dickson, 1939; Whyte, 1955) that have indicated that the production 
norms held by a group may result in pressure for employees to be either 
high or low producers.
The three remaining hypotheses were not supported by the present 
research. The effect that was relevant to Hypothesis 1, which was 
based on the work of Locke and his colleagues (e.g., Locke, 1966a;
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Locke and Bryan, 1967a), was significant, but not in the predicted 
direction. In the present study, subjects who were assigned the 
average of the self-set goals by the experimenter coded significantly 
more data than subjects who set their own goals. Also, subjects 
assigned a specific hard goal did not code significantly more data 
than did subjects in the other two groups. These results are con­
trary to Locke's and his associates1 findings that hard goals lead 
to higher performance levels than do easy or self-set goals.
Also, the results of the present research did not support Hypo­
thesis 3, which had predicted that the feedback of three coworkers 
would have more of an effect than the feedback of one coworker. Over­
all, this finding is Inconsistent with past research by Asch (1951; 
1956) which showed that as group size increased from one to three 
members, the subject's conformity in the face of group pressure also 
increased. This finding, though, is consistent with other research 
(Goldberg, 1954; Kidd, 1958) which found that group size had no effect 
on a subject’s conformity to group norms. However, the results of the 
analyses of simple effects which underlied the three-way interaction 
somewhat qualified this conclusion, since in the self-set goal con­
dition, Asch’s findings were replicated; that is, in this condition, 
the productivity of the subjects was significantly affected by the 
feedback of three coworkers, but not by the feedback of one coworker. 
This point is discussed more fully in a later section of this chapter.
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Finally, the results of the present study revealed a marginally 
significant three-way interaction, but the pattern of the adjusted 
means was not as predicted in Hypothesis 4. Further, this finding, 
when examined in greater detail through analyses of the simple effects, 
indicated that productivity was only significantly affected when sub­
jects set their own goals and then received feedback from three 
coworkers. This finding is contrary to the results of past research 
(Stedry, 1960) which suggested that subjects in the experimenter-set 
goal conditions should be affected by coworker pressure while subjects 
in the self-set condition should not be so affected.
A possible explanation for these results can be found in 
Festinger's (1950; 1954) social comparison theory. Essentially, 
Festinger's theory contains two basic ideas: (1) People have a
drive to evaluate themselves; and (2) in the absence of objective, 
nonsocial means, they will evaluate themselves in comparison with 
other people. In the present study, subjects were given a task to 
perform with which they had had little, if any, previous experience. 
Therefore, they did not have an internal standard to judge how much 
was a fair amount of data to code. After a rather brief 10-minute 
practice session in which the subjects were exposed to the task, they 
were either asked to set their own level of performance (self-set goal 
condition) or they were given a performance level to achieve by the 
experimenter (average of the self-set goal condition or a specific 
hard goal). It was assumed that in the self-set goal condition the
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subjects would use the number of lines they coded in the practice 
session as a guide in setting their goal level for the remaining 50 
minutes. Thus, for example, a subject who codes 15 lines during the 
10-minute practice session would conclude that she could code about 
75 (i.e., 5 x 15) lines in the remaining 50 minutes. However, this 
mathematical extrapolation appeared to be very difficult for many 
of the subjects in this condition. Many subjects seemed simply to 
pick a performance level without regard to how much they did during 
the practice session and they then tried to solicit feedback from the 
experimenter concerning the appropriateness of that goal level. Since 
the experimenter, in fact, did not comment on these subject-selected 
goal levels, and the subjects seemed not to possess a well-formed 
internal standard of how much would be appropriate, social comparison 
theory suggests that in this situation the subjects would be influenced 
by the feedback of their coworkers, since this was the only means 
available to them to evaluate the appropriateness of the goal level 
they had picked.
However, in the two experimenter set goal conditions, the sub­
jects were exposed to two sources of evaluative feedback: the
experimenter, who assigned the goal level, and the coworker(s), who 
said the goal level was either too high or too low. In these situa­
tions, it is possible that the subjects —  who received two disparate 
messages about the appropriateness of the goal and who had no internal 
standard —  became confused. To overcome this confusion, they might 
have ignored both sources of messages and simply coded as much data
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as they could in the remaining 50 minutes. If this explanation is 
correct, then results from the present research are congruent with 
Asch's finding that compliance behavior attenuates considerably when 
feedback from others is contradictory. Given the above explanation, 
it would be expected that only in the self-set goal condition would 
feedback from others have a significant effect on performance level, 
which, in fact, is what occurred in the present research.
The social comparison explanation also would account for why the 
results did not support Hypothesis 1. Subjects in the experimenter 
average-set goal condition coded significantly more data than did 
subjects who set their own goals (and whose expectations served as 
the basis for the goal provided in the average-set condition). Recall, 
that a subject in this experiment was recruited initially to help code 
data for a research project for which she would be paid $5 an hour.
She later was called to be a temporary replacement supposedly for 
someone who was sick. Most of the subjects Indicated after they 
were paid that they hoped they would be called If someone again became 
sick. It seems reasonable to infer from this that the subjects were 
highly motivated to do a good j ob —  that is, code as much data as 
they could —  because of the high pay and the desire to impress the 
experimenter. This motivation could have moderated the effect of goal 
setting in the two experimenter-set goal conditions. Thus, if the 
subjects, indeed, became confused due to disparate feedback and, so, 
ignored both the goal setting efforts of the experimenter and the 
feedback of their coworkers, their desire to impress the experimenter
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so that they might be called again would lead the subjects to code as 
much data as they could in the remaining 50 minutes. Whereas, the 
subjects in the self-set condition, who were equally motivated by 
the high pay and the desire to be called again, but who also were 
influenced to adjust their productivity according to their coworker’s 
feedback, might not be expected on the average to perform at as high 
a level as the subjects in the two experimenter-set goal conditions.
Also, if this explanation is correct, one would expect that 
subjects in both the experimenter average-set goal condition and the 
experimenter-set hard goal condition to perform at the same level —  
that is, code the same amount of data —  instead of subjects who were 
assigned a hard goal outperforming the subjects who were assigned the 
easy goals, as Locke’s (1966a; 1968) theory predicts. This is so 
because both experimenter-set goal groups would be equally confused 
by the disparate feedback from the experimenter and their coworker(s) 
and so they simply would try to code as much data as they could. The 
results of the present study indicated that there was no significant 
difference between the experimenter-set' hard goal adjusted mean and 
both the experimenter-set average and self-set goal adjusted means; 
however, the value of the experimenter-set hard goal adjusted mean was 
close to the experimenter average set adjusted mean, which lends 
support to this explanation.
Locke and his colleagues (e.g., Locke, 1968; Locke and Bryan, 
1967a) have formulated a theory of motivation based on goal setting.
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According to Locke, hard goals should produce a higher level of 
performance than easy goals, other things (such as ability) being 
equal. Goal setting as a means for improving employees’ perfor­
mance levels has generated a great deal of interest in the area of 
organizational behavior (e.g., Hampton, Summer, and Webber, 1973; 
Gilmer and Deci, 1977; Wexley and Yukl, 1977). However, virtually 
all of Locke's and his associates' data have been generated in the 
laboratory, with subjects recruited for psychological experiments 
and performing such tasks as addition problems, reaction time, and 
building windmills from tinkertoys. The present study was an attempt 
to investigate the effectiveness of goal setting in a "real-life" 
work situation with subjects who were recruited for a job and who 
were paid for their work. Since most jobs are not performed in 
isolation, the effect of work group norms was also, investigated.
The results of the present research suggest that coworker feed­
back does have a moderating effect on goal setting. Subjects were 
influenced by their coworker(s) to adjust their performance level 
in line with the work group norms, despite the goal setting attempts 
by the experimenter. However, Locke never claimed that goal setting 
would not be influenced by other factors such as coworker pressure.
It seems, though, that if Locke's goal theory is going to be applied 
in the "real-world" then it needs to be expanded in order to take 
into account possible moderating factors such as the norms of a 
person's work group. The present research suggests that simply to 
have a supervisor set goals, which an employee accepts at the time
they are set, will not necessarily lead to a corresponding change 
in performance, if an employee's work group has different goals.
Finally, the present research and Locke et al.'s laboratory 
studies all suffer from the same serious flaw since all used tasks 
with which the subjects had had little, if any, experience. Thus, 
the subjects had no internal standard for what was an appropriate 
level of performance. In such a situation it is not surprising that 
goal setting would serve to define and direct a person's behavior, 
as Locke's theory suggests. In Locke at al.'s research, the subjects 
had no other information to use to evaluate their behavior except 
the goal setting Information provided by the experimenter. Thus, it 
is reasonable to expect that a person given a task with which he or 
she had had little experience and then told, for example, to "do your 
best" would perform poorly. What about a person who has had experi­
ence with the task? An important question for future research would 
be to examine whether goal setting is effective in defining and 
directing behavior in situations where the person has an internal 
standard, based on experience with the task, for appropriate perfor­
mance. If goal setting is to be applied as a method for improving 
employee performance, as some of the current literature suggests, 
then this question must be examined unless we limit goal theory to 
jobs that are novel to the people performing them.
In summary, the present research was an investigation of the 
effects of goal setting, coworker feedback, and number of coworkers
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on performance level (productivity) In a simulated temporary work 
situation. The results indicated that contrary to the predictions, 
subjects were significantly influenced by coworker feedback and 
number of coworkers in the self-set goal condition, but not in the 
two experimenter-set goal conditions. A possible explanation for 
these results was suggested by Festinger’s (1950; 1954) theory of 
social comparison. Also, the results indicated that, contrary to 
the prediction generated from Locke's (e.g., Locke, 1968) theory 
of goal setting, subjects assigned hard goals did not code more data 
than did subjects who either set their own goals or were assigned 
the average of the self-set goals. Furthermore, subjects assigned 
the average goal of the self-set group did not perform at that level, 
but instead performed at a significantly higher level of performance 
than did the subjects who had set their own goals. It was proposed 
that these results were due to the confusion of the subjects, over 
what was an appropriate performance level, that was a consequence 
of contradictory feedback from the subject’s coworker(s) and the 
experimenter. Finally, the implications of the present study were 
discussed in terms of the applicability of Locke’s theory for complex, 
"real-life" work situations.
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